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The purpose of this article is to develop a microfounded type of wage con
tracts which will allow to introduce wage stickiness into dynamic gênerai
equilibrium models in a way which is analytically tractable, and enables to
reproduce a few empirical facts in a satisfactory manner. In particular we
shall see that thèse contracts create a propagation mechanism and strong
persistence in response to monetary shocks, a feature most often missing in
standard RBC models with money.
Our investigation will also help to clarify a "puzzle" arising in cur-
rent research on contracts and business cycles. A number of authors hâve
recently asked the question of whether staggered wage or price contracts
are sufficient by themselves to create a strong propagation mechanism for
monetary demand shocks, and the answers are surprisingly différent. For
example, although their models are of similar nature, Chari, Kehoe, Mc-
Grattan (2000) answer negatively, whereas Collard and Ertz (2000) answer
positively1. Our model will allow to isolate the most salient parameters, and
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clarify the différences.
The first question to ask when building such a model is of course :
which contracts ? Various types of wage contracts hâve indeed been develo-
ped since the seventies, notably associated with the names of Gray (1976),
Fischer (1977), Phelps-Taylor (1977), Phelps (1978), Taylor (1979, 1980)
and Calvo (1983). The contracts introduced by Calvo (1983) are particu-
larly interesting for us, because with a single parameter one can describe
contracts ranging from full wage flexibility to mil rigidity. To be more pré
cise this parameter, say 7, is the probability that a wage contract survives
unchanged until the next period. Each new contract is set on the basis of
the information of the current period. So for 7 = 0 wages are fully flexible,
for 7 = 1 they are totally rigid. This parameter 7 will appear absolutely
central for ail that follows2.
A particularity of Calvo contracts is that, as in Taylor (1979, 1980),
the value of the wage set in a particular contract remains constant throu-
ghout the duration of the contract. We would like to change this for at least
two reasons. The first is empirical : in reality multiyear contracts typically
stipulate différent wages for différent years. The second one is normative :
in an inflationary environment, since one would hâve to pick the same wage
for periods with highly différent price levels, such contracts could create
enormous inefficiencies.
So what we shall do is to construct a new contract which, while kee-
ping the central élégant feature of Calvo contracts, allows the value of the
negotiated wages to dépend on time. This wili solve the two problems above.
Moreover thèse contracts give a degree of persistence similar to that of the
original Calvo contracts, so that this positive feature is also maintained.
Two other important characteristics deserve to be stressed : the first
is that, within our given contract structure, the values of wage contracts
themselves will be derived from the behavior of utility maximizing trade-
unions, and not postulated, as is usually the case in most of this literature.
The second one is that we shall obtain closed form solutions for both the
value of contracts and the resulting macrodynamics. This will enable us
to find in particular which parameters are fundamental in the persistence
issue, and why various authors hâve obtained différent results.
The plan of the article is the following : section 2 describes the model,
section 3 dérives the dynamics in the case where ail markets clear, sec
tion 4 dérives the demand for labor, section 5 computes the optimal wage
contracts, section 6 studies the macroeconomic dynamics, and notably the
output response to monetary shocks.
2 An earli8r investigation of similar nature than this paper's was carried out in an tnsightful article by Ascari
(2000). He uses the original Taylor contract with a fixed duration of 2 periods. We shall see below that having
7, and thus the average length of the contract, as a "free parameter" is important for a fufl description of the
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2 The model
2.1 Markets and agents
The economy studied is a monetary economy with markets for goods at the
(average) price Pt and markets for labor at the (average) wage Wt. Goods
markets are compétitive. The labor markets function under a System of
imperfectly compétitive labor contracts, which will be detailed below.
The output index Yt is an aggregate of a continuum of output types,
indexed by i e [0,1] :
Jo
Logyt = / LogYudi (1)
Jo
Each index Yit is itself the aggregate of another infinity of output
types indexed by k3 :
ai v 1/0
Yfktdk ) 0 < S < 1 (2)
/
We may note that this représentation differs from the "traditional"
one, where only one CES agregator like (2) is assumed. The natural interpré
tation of our structure is that index i represents sectors, whereas the index
k represents firms within thèse sectors. It is fully natural to assume, as we
do, that there is more substitutability within sectors than across sectors.
Now we will further assume that ail firms with the same index i face
exactly the same situation in terms of wage contracts. This means notably
that ail firms within a sector, although they compete through priées and
wages, negotiate wages at exactly the same time. In the contrary thèse
negotiations need not be synchronized between différent sectors. So one
main différence between sectors, as we shall see below, is that they will
usually hâve signed différent wage contracts at différent times.
Finally firm (i,k) has a production function :
Yikt = ZtN«kt (3)
where Zt is a technological shock common to ail firms.
The représentative consumer (we omit the indexes i or k at this stage)
works Nt, consumes Ct and ends the period with a quantity of money Mt. He
maximizes the expected value of his discounted utilities, with the following
intertemporal utility :
r \/i i
(4) U = E^ [L°g^ + wL°g^- - V (Nt)\
3 We could use the more précise notation fcj instead of k, but this would complicate the notation without
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where V is a convex function. At the beginning of period t there is a sto-
chastic multiplicative monetary shock as in Lucas (1972) : money holdings
carried from the previous period Mt-i are multiplied by the same factor
Ht for ail agents, so that the représentative household starts period t with
money holdings [ÀtMt-i. His budget constraint in t is thus :
ct + ^ = ^v, + i^ + n, (5)
where nt are profits distributed.
2.2 Wage contracts
Let us now describe the wage contracts. As in Calvo (1983), in each period
there is a random draw for ail contracts, after which any particular contract
will continue unchanged (with probability 7), or be terminated (with pro
bability 1 — 7). In this last case the corresponding contract wages are set by
the workers in each firm on the basis of ail information currently available.
Note that our assumption that contracts in the same sector (i.e. with
the same index i) are renegotiated at the same time implicitly means that
the random drawings take place sector by sector.
We dénote by Wt the average wage, and by Xst the wage contract
signed in period s to be in effect in period t (as we shall find out below,
ail workers who sign a new contract in s for period t choose the same wage
level, so that we do not need to index Xst by i or k). The assumption in
Calvo was that Xst is independent of t for ail t ^ s. In the contrary we shall
assume that thèse can be différent for ail periods.
3 The Walrasian régime
We shall now, as a benchmark for what follows, compute the Walrasian
equilibrium of this economy. In that case ail workers hâve the same wage
Wt, which clears the labor market. Production and employment are the
same in ail firms and related by :
Yi = ZtN? (6)
The real wage is equal to the marginal productivity of labor :
W, YtJean-Pascal Bénassy 129
The households maximize the expected value of the utility function (4)




and the first order conditions :
*« = 7^ (9)
\
)
V (Nt) =^ (11)
Combining (9), (10) and the définition /j,t+i = Mt+i/Mt we obtain :
which can be solved as :
We see further, combining (7), (9) and (11) that Walrasian employ-
ment is constant and equal to N, which is given by :
NV'(N) = a (14)
In what follows we shall extensively use the following disutility of
labor :
^ (15)
in which case the Walrasian level of employment is :
f) (16)
and the Walrasian wage :130 Recherches économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(2), 2003
4 Wage contracts : the demand for labor
We shall now begin the study of our model under wage contracts. It is as-
sumed that ail goods markets are compétitive, but that consumers-workers.
possibly through trade-unions, décide on the level of wages in a framework
of monopolistic compétition, and supply the amount of labor demanded by
firms at thèse wages. In this section we shall dérive the demand for labor
addressed to consumers.
Hère the demand for labor dérives from the demand for goods, so
we start with this last one. At any time there is a multiplicity of priées
due to the fact that wages are différent across firms. Consider first the firms
producing final output. For a given aggregate output index Yt they minimize
costs, i.e. they solve the following program :
max PtYt- f PuYitdi s.t. / LogYitdi = LogYt
Jïi Jo
whose solution is :
y* = 4£
" "it
LogPt = f LogPitdi (19)
Jo
Now for a given index Yit firms will similarly minimize costs, i.e. they
solve :
r1 ( f1 \1/G
maxPuYu-j PiktYiktdk s.t. ( / Yfktdkj =Yit
whose solution is :
/p \-i/(i-o)
Yikt = YU (^J (20)
Ul
Putting together équations (18) and (20) we obtain the expression of
the demand for goods :
(22)
An important thing to remember for what follows is that, in view of
équation (18), ail sectors hâve exactly the same value of sales :
PitYit = PtYt V* (23)Jean-Pascal Bénassy 131
The firm (i, k) competitively maximizes profits PiktYikt — Wj
subject to production function (3). This yields the usual first order condi
tion:
ikt = aPiktYikt (24)
Let us combine this first-order condition with the production function





5 Optimal wage contracts
We shall dérive the optimal wage contracts, assuming from now on the
particular disutility of labor :
V(Nt) = ^- (26)
The value of contracts signed in period s for periods t^ sis obtained
by maximizing the expectation, as of period s, of the discounted utility (4)
subject to budget constraints (5) and labor demands (25). The following
proposition characterizes thèse contracts :
Proposition 1 : The wage contract Xst signed in s for period t is given by :
Xst ~
Proof : Appendix 1.
We may note that, using équation (17) giving the value of the Walra-
sian wage W£, équation (27) can be rewritten under the simpler and more
intuitive form :
x^t = -^Es(w;r (28)
We thus see that X%t is equal to the expected value in s of (Wt*)",
multiplied by X/aO, i.e. the usual "monopolistic markup" corresponding to
the isoelastic labor demand curve (25).132 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(2), 2003
6 Macroeconomic dynamics
Before deriving the macroeconomic dynamics of this model let us briefly
summarize the results obtained in the previous sections and appendix 1 : ail
consumers hâve the same income, consumption and money holdings. They
differ, however. by their wage and employment level. In any firm the wage
level in period t dépends only on the date s when it was negotiated, and we
denoted by Xst the corresponding wage. Since wages differ across sectors,
so do priées, and we find in appendix 1 (formula 63) the value of the price
Pst in a sector where the wage is Xst :
<»>
6.1 Output dynamics
Using formula (13), the equality Ct — Yu and going to logarithms, we find
that output is given by4 :
yt = Log + mt - pt (30)
We thus hâve to dérive the aggregate price pt. We first hâve the gênerai
formula (19) :
= / LogPitdi (31)
Because of the law of large numbers, and in view of the uniform sur-
vival rate 7 for ail wage contracts. in period t a proportion (1 — 7)7* ~s of
the wage contracts cornes from period s ^ t. The same proportions apply,
of course, to priées so that formula (31) is rewritten:
t
J2 ~s pt = LogPt = (1 - 7) J2 V~sLogPst (32)
in which we recognize a formula very similar to the corresponding one in
Calvo (1983). Inserting (29) into (32) we obtain :
r (i - 0)Mt~\ J~
pt = (l-a)Log -zf-aLoga+a(l-7) > (33)
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6.2 Impulse response functions
Formula (36) shows that the response to a monetary shock can be quite
persistent. We can get a first idea of the time profile of this response by
Computing the impulse response functions of output to a monetary shock.
The important parameters are of course 7 and p. A value for p quite usually
found in the literature is p = 0.5. As for 7, let us first compute the average
duration of wage contracts : a contract has a probability (1 — 7)7^ to be still




The average duration of wage contracts is usually considered to lie
between one and two years. So two impulse responses hâve been plotted in
figures 1 and 2. Both use the value p = 0.5. Figure 1 takes 7 = 4/5 (which
corresponds to a one year, or 4 quarters, duration of contracts), while figure




We see that both response fonctions show persistence, and even dis-
play a hump, which is more marked for the 2 years contract case than for
the one year contract case.
6.3 The hump
Formula (36) suggests, and figures 1 and 2 confirm, that the response of
output to a money shock may be first increasing, and then decreasing, giving
thus rise to the "hump" which apparently characterizes the actual response
to money shocks (Cogley, Nason, 1995). We shall make this more précise
through the following proposition, which tells us under which conditions a
hump will occur, as well as its timing :
Proposition 3 : Under the monetary process (35) there will be a hump in
the response of output to money if:
7> (41)136 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(2), 2003
In that case the time at which the hump occurs is the integer j given by :
1 / 1 -7 \
3 < ~r Log T- < j + 1 (42)
Logp V1-7P/




(1 - 7X)(1 - ypL) 1 - p [ 1 - 7L 1 - 7PL
The term of order j is a multiple of :
T*-p{>rp)s (44)
The hump will thus occur for the integer value j such that :
7'"1 - p(jPy-1 < 7J' - p{ip)j > 7'+1 - P(1P)J+1 (45)
Thèse two inequalities are rewritten :
^ < T^Tp < <* (46)
Going to logarithms this yields :
j < j^— Log (-î—y-) < j + 1 (47)
Log/9 \\--yp)
which is équation (42). Now for this to correspond to an actual hump, the
value of j so obtained must be greater than one :
Logp l--ypj
> 1 (48)
which yields équation (41). Q.E.D.
We may give a simple explanation of condition (41) for a humpshaped
employment and output response. Intuitively the employaient response to
a monetary shock j periods after the shock will be proportional to the
product of two factors : (a) the proportion of wage contracts remaining, i.e.
7J+1, (b) the cumulative money shock, taking into account the fact that
money incréments are autocorrelated, i.e. 1 + p + ... + pi. Now a necessary
and sufficient condition for a hump is that the impact at time j = 1 be
greater than the impact at time j = 0, i.e. that 72(1 + p) > 7, which yields
condition (41).Jean-Pascal Bénassy 137
6.4 The autocorrélations of output variations
Another stylized fact that traditional models often fail to reproduce is the
positive autocorrélations of output variations, at least at short lags (Cogley-
Nason (1995)). We shall consider monetary shocks only (formula 35), and
see, via the following proposition, that our model allows to reproduce thèse
positive autocorrélations.
Proposition 4: Dénote output variations by Ayi = yt — yt-\. Thèse are
autocorrelated in time according to the formula :




Proof : Appendix 3.
Using formula (49), we can actually compute explicitly autocorréla
tions at various lags. The autocorrélation at lag one is relatively simple :
(51)
For greater lags, formulas become A'ery rapidly clumsy, but the com
puter easily générâtes the autocorrélations profiles. Figure 3 depicts the
autocorrélations of output variations at various lags, for the same para-
meter values as in figure 2. We see that at low values of the lags, thèse
autocorrélations are indeed positive, as in the data.
6.5 The propagation puzzle
We can now with the help of our model and the explicit solutions throw some
light on the very différent answers given in the literature on the ability
of models with contracts to create a propagation mechanism for demand
shocks. Propositions 2, 3 and 4 clearly show that, for that issue, the most
important parameters are 7 and p, so we organize the discussion around
them.
Consider, as an example, the articles by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan
(2000) and Collard and Ertz (2000), whose results are particularly différent.
The first article estimâtes p = 0.57. the second p = 0.495, so that the
différence will come only marginally from that parameter. Let us now move
to the parameter 7, which, as we shall see, is at the root of the différences.Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(2), 2003
In order to make the discussion more intuitive, we actually take as the
parameter of discussion the average length of contracts, equal to 7/(1 — 7).
Now Collard and Ertz (2000) study wage contracts of the Calvo (1983)
type. Their central parameter is thus very similar to the 7 of this article.
As a resuit, they show that one year or two years contracts lead to strong
propagation and a hump, a resuit completely in accordance with the results
of this article.
At the opposite, Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000) consider price
contracts with a duration of 13 weeks (i.e. a quarter), and find that their
model delivers much less persistence than in reality. They consider indeed
the "halflife" of the process, i.e. the time it takes for the effect of a shock to
be half of the impact effect. They report a halflife of 10 quarters in reality,
while using our formulas with their parameters we find less than 2 quarters,
obviously much too low. Clearly by choosing contracts of a very low duration
they did not find a propagation mechanism in a quite predictable manner5.
5 A (urther cause for their finding of a low persistence is that they use price contracts which, for the same
duration, often lead to less persistence than wage contracts (Andersen, 1998).Jean-Pascal Bénassy _^_^__ 139
7 Conclusion
In this paper we developed a new form of wage contracts with maximizing
trade-unions, and integrated it into a rigorous business cycle model. We
were able to obtain closed form solutions throughout, for both the optimal
wage contracts and the resulting macroeconomic dynamics. We found that
we could generate a strong propagation mechanism, and in particular pro
duce a hump-shaped response of output to monetary shocks, and positive
autocorrélations of output variations at short lags. Thèse are features that
hâve been observed in the data, and which traditional RBC models often
failed to reproduce.
From our closed form solutions it appears also that the parameter
7 describing the "survival rate" of contracts, which is the basis of Calvo's
(1983) and our contract, is also a central parameter in explaining the ca-
pacities of the model to create an endogenous propagation mechanism. In
particular many différences in the literature on this subject seem to mainly
boil down to différent values in the (implicit or explicit) value of this para
meter.
Appendix 1 : Proof of Proposition 1
Since we do not know yet whether ail consumers will sign the same contracts
in the same period, we dénote by Xikst the contract signed by consumer (i, k)
at time s, to be in effect in period t. In order to détermine Xikst, consumer
(i, k) maximizes his discounted expected utility. We shall consider hère only
the terms corresponding to the contracts signed in s and still in effect at
time t. so the relevant wage is X^st- Since contracts hâve a probability 7
to survive each period, the contract signed in s has a probability 7t~5 to be
still in effect in period t, and the consumer will thus maximize the expected
value in s of the following discounted utility :
^ £5kl (52) $> [ ^
subject to the budget constraints in each period :
Oikt H 5 H hkt = —5—Nikt H 5 H H* (53)
"t "t rt
and the équations giving the demand for labor (formula 25) :
Nlkt = ««XrJ"-" (54)
(1~°') (55)140 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(2), 2003
Inspecting this maximization problem, we first see that ail consumers
sharing the same index i face exactly the same circumstances, so that in
equilibrium we will hâve :
Xikst - Xist Vfc (56)
So ail consumers in the same sector i hâve the same wage and em-
ployment. Now in view of équations (23) and (24), in any sector i :
WitNit = aPitYit = aPtYt (57)
We see that ail consumers, whatever the sector i they are in, hâve
the same income, and therefore the same consumption and money holdings
(but they differ, of course, in their wages and employment levels) :
Cikt = Ct Mikt = Mt Vi,fc (58)
Consumers indexed by (i, k) maximize (52) subject to (53) and (54).
Let us insert the value of JV^t (équation 54) into (52) and (53). Taking into
account (58) the corresponding Lagrangean is written (we omit the terms
that will not be used) :
~Ct\f
J J WV/Loer* 4X, [ / ,P 7 S^ogu* ^u^ikst +A^-t \5Aikst
(59)
Maximization in Ct yields :
A*** = -i- (60)
w
Now when choosing in period s the various contract wages Xikst y t ^ s,
the consumer maximizes the expected value in s of the maximand (59). The
part concerning Xikst is thus, suppressing uniinportant constants :
'[PÏCÏ **" ~^Xifcst J (61)
The first order condition for this program is :
bs [<S>it) (62)
We now hâve to compute the value of $it (équation 55). Combining
équations (3) and (57), we find that :
Pu =Jean-Pascal Bénassy 141
Inserting this into (55) yields :
Va = a*t*tXiat (64)
We now insert (64) into (62) using Xiksi = Xisi (équation 56). Equa
tion (62) then simplifies as :
a exist = SE* {otPtYt) (65)
We see that the value of Xist is independent of the sector «, and we
dénote it as Xst. Now from équation (13), which is still valid, we know that :
"t*t — Mt
Inserting (66) into (65) we find :
a*0Xït=ç[ï^±JEl,M? (67)
which yields directly (27).
Appendix 2
Lemma 1 : Assume the monetary process (35). Then :
(1-7)
(1 2(1 - 7p) (1 - V) (i _ 7)
ProofrSince the monetary \rariables are lognormal, we use the standard
formula :
Log[Et-j (M?)]1'" = Emirat) + uVar^m^ (69)
with :
Let us compute in turn the mean and variance :
l-pL+ + l-pL (71)142 Recherches Economiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(2), 2003
mt - Et-j-mt = (l + p + ....pi~l) ut-j+i + (l + p ■+■ ...pi~2) «t-j+2 + + ut
(72)
1-pi 1-pi-1




- nX* 3- + (73)

















Combining (75), (76) and (77) we find (68).
(77)
Q.E.D.Jean-Pascal Bénassy 143
Appendix 3 : Proof of Proposition 4
We saw above that output is given by, up to a constant :
y>= iitmifL) (78)
Consequently output variations Ayt are given by :




Ayl=aY^1iUt-i + bJ2Cut-i (81)
i=0 i=0
00 00
Ayt-j = a^2 7kut-j-k + b^ Ckut-j-k (82)
fc=O A:=()
To compute the covariance between Ay< and Ayt-j we only keep in
the expression of Ayt the values of the lag above j :
(83)
Putting together formulas (82) and (83) we obtain :
1 - -y2 + 1 - C2 + 1 - 7C
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